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Double Auction (DA) is a type of auction where there is has more than one seller and 
more than one buyer in the market. It gives us a mechanism by which we can study how 
price is determined under incomplete information and whether efficiency is achieved 
when the traders are not price takers. The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) states that 
price conveys information of the market and it has raised much debate about its validity. 
DA can provide us with an explicit and realistic setting to prove or disprove the 
hypothesis. It is hoped that this paper can shed some insights on this debate. My paper 
extends Kyle (1989)'s model to a DA model and examines a large market (i.e. with 
sufficiently many buyers and sellers) consisting of informed speculators, uninformed 
speculators, and noise traders. The traders adopt linear demand schedules, bid for 
continuous trading quantities, and they can trade in multiple units of a homogenous asset. 
This paper has shown that the fully revealing properties of price only depend on the 
sensitivity of the traders to their own private signals. The market would be fully revealing 
if the informed buyers and sellers happen to be equally sensitive to the private 
information they have received. If a market has only informed speculator and/or noise 
traders, the uninformed buyers would not want to enter the market as they would only 
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1. Introduction 
Auction has a long history. The Greek historian Herodotus has recorded the sale of 
women as wives through auction in Babylonia (Milgrom and Weber, 1982) as early as 
the fifth century B.C. Since then, different types of auctions have developed from mineral 
mines to livestock and from artwork to U.S. Treasury bills. In a typical auction setup, 
there is one seller who possesses an asset and many buyers who submit bids according to 
their valuation of the asset. The seller plays a passive role and waited for the buyers to 
determine the price. 
In double auction (DA), however, the sellers can be as active as the buyers. There 
can be more than one seller and more than one buyer in the market. All sellers possess 
one or more unit of a homogenous asset and the buyers try to bid for the asset according 
to their valuation. Each agent would receive a signal, and then simultaneously submit 
bids to the auctioneer. One type of DA is that each agent is allowed to bid/offer for only 
one unit of an asset. The buyer submits a sealed bid indicating the maximum price he is 
willing to pay for a single unit of asset and each seller submits a sealed offer that 
indicates the minimum price at which he is willing to sell the single unit he owns. There 
is also another type of DA that allows the traders to trade in multiple units. They indicate 
the quantities they request at each possible level of price. At either type, after collecting 
all the bids and offers, the auctioneer then chooses a market-clearing price p, where all 
trades are settled at p. Each trader submits a bid/offer based solely on the information he 
receives. It would be too late to change one's bid after the market-clearing price is 
determined. As a result, traders do not condition their bids directly on the market price. 
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On the other hand, in equilibrium, they are aware of the others ' bidding strategies and 
take them into account. 
A typical construction of the interval of clearing prices (by Wilson 1985): 
Price 
K m n 
Quantity 
Figure 1: Construction of Double Auction Market Clearing Price 
In the above diagram, there are m buyers and n sellers. The m bids are arranged 
from the maximum to the minimum in terms of values and the n offers are ordered from 
the lowest to the highest and these form the supply and demand curves. The price will be 
any one between the range p E [ p, ~ l It follows that the price p = (1 -k) p + k ~ , where 
different choice of k E [0,1] defines a different mechanism, hence the name k-Double 
Auction (k-DA). Trade occurs for the buyers who bid at least p and sellers whose offers 
were no more than p. If k tends to 0, then the DA favors the sellers as the buyers cannot 
influence price when they trade. That means they cannot acquire a lower trading price by 
lowering their bids. So their best strategy would be to bid according to their reservation 
price. On the other hand, if k tends to 1, then the setting would favor the buyers. 
Why are we interested in the double auction? Double Auction presents a workable 
market that has efficiency properties in the absence of complete information (Wilson 
1985). The double auction is used extensively in stock markets such as the New York 
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Stock Exchange, commodity markets including the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and 
markets like financial instruments, including options and futures. 
My paper will focus on the double auction setting with the presence of the 
informed, uninformed speculators and noise traders. My motivation of this topic is that 
DA can provide a channel for us to have insights to several questions: (i) How does 
market price convey information? According to the traditional strong form Efficient 
Market Hypothesis (EMH), price conveys both the public and private information of the 
market. DA gives an explicit mechanism for us to investigate the validity of this 
hypothesis. (ii) Does the possession of private information really benefit the traders? If 
this is the case, how come some people who do not have private information would also 
like to participate into the market? This is more than a theoretical question as we can see 
that the stock market, for example, is so attractive to people no matter they have private 
information or not. DA can investigate what motives each trader to participate into the 
market and under what circumstances these players will gain or quit. Moreover, DA 
provides a setting to explore the informational efficiency of a market of incomplete 
information to see if the price reveals the true value of the assets. I hope my paper will 
give some insights of these topics. 
My paper will be organized as follows: Section 2 will talk about the terminology 
used in the papers of double auction as well as in my paper. Literature reviews will be in 
Section 3. Section 4 will be about the model. Then it follows the main results of the 
paper. Extensions are at Section 6 and lastly, the conclusion. 
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2. Terminology 
Let us go through some useful terminologies before we take a look at the 
literature review. The definitions is from Milgrom (1981) and Reny and Perry (2006). 
A rational expectations -equilibrium (REE) are functions mapping states of 
information into a price vector and an allocation, respectively, with the properties that: 
(i) each bidder maximizes his expected utility, subject to his budget constraint; 
(ii) the net trades sum to zero, i.e. the market clears; 
(iii) each bidder' s expectations properly reflect both his private information and 
any information which can be inferred from the vector of prices. 
Prices are fully revealing if the price vector is a sufficient statistic for all of the 
information observed by all of the traders. In other words, the prices can reflect all the 
information of the market, no matter private or public. 
3. Literature Review 
The literature review is never exhaustive. However, the papers chosen below are 
the highlights of the field of auctions in economics. 
The literature started from examining the one-sided auction. Milgrom (1981) tried 
to develop a bidding model to resemble the REE model by using the multi-object Vickrey 
auction. The Vickrey auction is a one-sided auction with many buyers and k objects 
available to be sold. The highest k bids will win the auction with the price equals to the 
kth highest bid. Many papers study models where the trading objects' qualities are 
known, only the preferences of the opposing bidders are unknown. Milgrom, nonetheless, 
allows the objects traded are of unknown attributes at the time of bidding. He finds that if 
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the number of bidders grows large, the winning bid may converge to the true value of the 
object, even though no bidder knows the value when the bids are tendered. Thus the price 
aggregates information from many bidders. The paper also solves a problem he has raised 
at the beginning of the paper: if information is costly and price is fully revealing, then at 
equilibrium no trader is willing to pay for information. Then the price will not be fully 
revealing as it does not aggregate information. He finds that agents who are poorly 
informed will only lose in the auction. In his model, the bidders are acted as price takers 
and there is no tension between the incentive to gather information and the informational 
efficiency of prices. In his paper, obtaining a fully revealing REE is a strong assumption, 
if the market does not have enough traders, the price may not be always revealing. 
Another significant contribution of his paper is that he has proved the mono tonic 
likelihood ration property (MLRP): 
Y has the (strict) monotone likelihood ratio property if the likelihood ratio 
function j{y I z )lj{y I z ') is nonincreasing (decreasing) in y (on its domain of definition) 
whenever z' > z and nondecreasing (increasing) whenever z '. 
To put into practice, it states that the higher numerically valued signals will 
represent relatively better news than lower signals. That means an agent who receives a 
numerically higher valued signal would value the asset higher. 
Hellwig(1979)'s paper is an improvement of Grossman (1975)'s 1 paper which 
studies the one-sided auction. Grossman's paper finds that the aggregation of information 
through price depends on the information vector (11, ... ,In). Hellwig proves that it also 
depends on the strength of agent i' s reaction to this information, which is measured by his 
1 GROSSMAN, S. (1975): "On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets where Traders have 
Diverse Information," T echnical Report No. 182, Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social 
Sciences, Stanford University. 
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preferences. The market considered is a large market, at which there are a lot of agents in 
the market and individuals have no influence on price. The rationale is that a lot of papers 
treat the buyers as "schizophrenic" in which they neglect their effects on price. In order to 
avoid such a paradox, he studies only the large market. Individual can only exert 
negligible effects on price. So the agents can be regarded as price takers and they bid 
according to the information received. In his model, each agent receives information 
based on the true return of the asset to be bid plus a noise: yi = X+ &i, where yi is the 
private information received, X is the true return and £i is the perturbation. Price is a 
linear function of information and aggregate supply. The risk aversions of the agents are 
also taken into account. He has found that, firstly, the relative importance of an agent's 
information becomes inverse! y proportional to his degree of risk aversion. The 
aggregation of information in a large market depends on agents' preference as well as on 
the precision2 of their signals. A more precise signal and a less risk averse agent will have 
a greater impact on price. Secondly, as the agents' number increases, the equilibrium 
price tends to depend only on X, which is a common element in all the signals received 
by all players. The noise £i disappears from the equilibrium price, by the weak law of 
large numbers. 
Kyle (1989) further develops from Hellwig (1980)'s model setup. Hellwig uses 
the large market to solve the price-taking behavior of the agents; Kyle tries to solve the 
problem by other means. Instead of a setting with a large market and many bidders and/or 
each trader submits a bid that is continuous, he proposes to study a model with imperfect 
competitors. These are individuals who have access to private information and take into 
2 Precision is the reciprocal of variance. 
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account explicitly the effect their trading on prices. Moreover, there are also noise traders 
and uninformed speculators. 
His model is a one-period one-sided auction with many buyers. Each informed 
speculator will be endowed with unique private information. They have the same degree 
of risk aversion and receive information of the same precision. The uninformed 
speculators receive no information. They submit their demand schedule indicating their 
quantity demanded at different price. Noise traders trade in aggregate an exogenous 
random quantity, which is not based on maximizing behavior. This can be considered as 
submitting a vertical demand schedule to the auctioneer and they are willing to trade in 
fixed quantity no matter at what price. The players submit their demand schedule to the 
auctioneer, and then the set of market-clearing prices and quantity allocations is 
calculated. Under his model, prices never reveal more than half of the private information 
of the informed speculators and are not fully revealing. In addition, the absence of noise 
traders would cause the market to collapse. At the limit as noise trading vanishes, profits 
based on private information are driven to zero. 
Kyle's model seems to solve the puzzling problem of price-taking behavior in the 
auction theories, but some researchers are not satisfied that the equilibrium price is not a 
rational expectations equilibrium (REE). 
Chatteijee and Samuelson (1983)'s paper is recognized as probably the first to 
consider a double auction-like setting. Their model is a symmetric setting with one buyer 
and one seller, each agent possesses private information. They bargain over the price of 
trade and it is a single-stage Nash bargaining game. Each agent knows his own 
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reservation price3 but is uncertain about his opponent's, assessing a subjective probability 
distribution over the range of possible values that his opponent might hold. Seller and 
buyer have no prior communication and submit sealed offers s and b respectively. If b 2::: 
s, a bargain is enacted and the good is sold at price P= kb + (1-k) s, where 1 2::: k 2::: 0. 
When k equals 1, the trading price is determined solely by the buyer's bid, while the 
seller's offer serves only to determine whether there is a trade or not. The Nash 
equilibrium implies an offer strategy is monotonic in its own reservation price and 
depends on its assessment of the opponent's reservation price. The main result is that, 
given incomplete information, not all mutually beneficial agreements can be attained via 
bargaining. Even when the buyer values the good more highly than the seller, a 
successful trade may not be possible. 
From Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983), the researchers begin to look at the model 
with more than one buyer and seller. Satterthwaite and Williams (1989) study the BBDA 
model: sellers and buyers simultaneously submit offers and bids. The market-clearing 
price is set as the highest endpoint of the offers-and-bids intersection. This procedure is 
called the buyer's bid double auction (BBDA) because in the one seller-one buyer case, 
the buyer's bid determines the price whenever trade occurs. This is a particular kind ofk-
DA in which case k = 1. Each seller in the BBDA has a dominant strategy to set his offer 
equal to his reservation value because he cannot influence the price when he trades. In 
response to these dominant strategies, each buyer has an incentive to bid less than his 
reservation value, which causes BBDA to be ex-post inefficient. Their model has m 
buyers and m sellers, where m 2::: 2. They do not define the private information received 
3 The seller's reservation price would be the smallest sum he will accept in exchange for the good 
(independent of his level of income); the buyer's reservation price would be the greatest sum he is willing 
to pay for the good. 
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but assume that the reservation values of the sellers and buyers are drawn from some 
distribution F1 and F2 respectively. Each trader simultaneously submits a bid/offer. Their 
offers/bids are pooled together and arrayed in increasing order and the price is set at the 
(m+ 1 )th order. Numerical examples are included to supplement the model proposed by 
the authors. They prove that in any equilibrium strategy of the buyers the difference 
between the buyer's bid and his reservation value is 0(1/m), regardless of the 
distributions of the reservation values. Thus, as the market grows, competitive pressures 
quickly push buyers towards truthful revelation of their reservation price and the 
equilibrium outcome towards an ex post efficient, perfectly competitive allocation. That 
means that in a large market equilibrium outcomes are close to Walrasian outcomes. But 
BBDA and Walrasian market are based upon very different notions about what happens 
in a market. The outcome of a Walrasian market is efficient no matter how many traders 
are present, while in the BBDA model information and individual incentives cause 
inefficiency in a finite market. 
Rustichini, Satterthwaite and Williams ( 1994) extend the previous paper to 
general k-double auction. For their k-DA setting, there are n sellers and m buyers. The 
auctioneer would list all n+m offers/bids as S(t) :::;sc2) :::;s(n+m) and the price is set at (1-
k)s(m)+ kscm+t ), where k is a fixed parameter in the interval [0, 1]. They show that as the 
number of traders increases, the market-clearing price would become fully revealing and 
the market rapidly approaches allocational efficiency. The maximal difference between a 
trader's valuation of the asset and his equilibrium offer/bid is 0(1/m). As m increases, 
each trader's strategy thus converges rapidly to truthful reporting of his valuation and the 
indeterminacy of the market outcome becomes inconsequential, no matter how many 
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equilibria may exist. They also define the expected efficiency of an equilibrium, which is 
the fraction whose numerator is the expected gains from trade across all traders in the 
equilibrium and whose denominator is the expected gains from trader across all traders if 
they instead acted as price-takers and hence realized all possible gains from trade. The 
expected inefficiency is one minus this ratio and result shows that this equals 
0(1/m2).Numerical evidence provided by the authors shows that the k-DA is more 
efficient and has the fastest possible rate of convergence compared with other 
mechanisms presented by the authors. This bridges the gap between the theory of 
bilateral bargaining under incomplete information, with its indeterminacy and 
inefficiency, and the theory of a competitive market, with its deterministic and perfectly 
efficient outcome. If the number of traders is sufficiently large in the market, k-DA 
approaches ex-post efficiency. 
Wilson (1985) has similar results showing that DA is incentive efficiency, i.e. no 
other trading rule is sure to be preferred by each agent, whatever his preferences. The 
paper starts to consider a problem of designing a rule to determine the terms of trade 
among several agents who have private information about their preferences. Each rule 
induces a game of incomplete information among the agents, so the welfare 
consequences are predicted from the agents' Nash equilibrium strategies. Then the 
players try to seek a rule that is incentive efficient. He has tried to look at the double 
auction to implement the W alrasian model of exchange. He allows the traders to have 
independent private values of the objects being traded and has found that if the numbers 
of buyers and sellers are sufficiently large, then the double auction is incentive efficient. 
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Many of the models concermng the auction theory requtre the existence of 
uninformed, irrational, or nonstrategic agents, otherwise, markets would collapse. For 
example, the Vickrey-type auctions have buyers behaving strategically based on their 
private information; on the other hand, the sellers are passive, simply attending the 
auction with a fixed number of units available for sale at any nonnegative price. These 
sellers are regarded as playing a similar role as the noise traders in the models of Hell wig 
and Kyle. Their number must grow to sufficiently large in order to ensure information is 
aggregated. Reny and Perry (2003) argue that a fully satisfactory foundation for REE 
should permit all traders (buyers and sellers) to be informed, rational, and strategic. They 
suggest that the asset's value should be partially private and partially common. The 
traders can manipulate prices strategically. The DA provides platform to investigate the 
extent to which price manipulation and inefficiency vanish, and the extent to which price-
taking behavior approximates strategic behavior as the market becomes large. Normally, 
it is in the interest of buyers to underbid and of sellers to overbid, in an attempt to affect 
the price at their advantage. As a result, some efficient trades may go unrealized. The 
authors find that if the bids and offers must be submitted in discrete units from a 
sufficiently fine price grid, if the market contains sufficiently many buyers and sellers, 
then the equilibrium is close to an efficient fully revealing REE, and the equilibrium 
behavior is close to price-taking behavior. 
Cripps and Swinkels (2006) have tried to relax the independence across players. 
The players' values satisfy z-independence, z E [0,1]. 1-independencce means there is 
independence across players. z is uniformly distributed in the number of players, if the 
number of players grows, dependence will be lower. Cripps and Swinkels allow the 
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players to be highly asymmetric and can bid for multiple units. The players are strategic 
players. They define a term "no asymptotic gaps", meaning when the players are 
submitting a bid, any interval is eventually hit in expectation by many players. This paper 
is more in line with the Rustichini, Satterthwaite and Williams (1994) paper that they do 
not specifically consider the private signals problem. They only consider that the players 
have different valuations of the asset based on the same distribution. They find that as the 
number of players grows, all of the nontrivial equilibrium of the double auction setting 
converges to the Walrasian outcome. Allocational inefficiency disappears in the limit. 
Mathematically, inefficiency disappears at a rate La , for any a >0. 
n 
My paper will be a modification of Kyle (1989)'s model. The motives of 
following his paper are: Firstly, most papers consider the traders only bidding/offering 
for one unit of an asset. However, his model allows buyers and sellers to trade in multiple 
units. Moreover, there are three types of buyers/sellers in his model: informed, 
uninformed speculators and noise traders. By analyzing the market with these types of 
players step by step, I hope to bridge the gaps between the literatures having only 
informed traders and those having also uninformed and noise traders. Thirdly, his paper 
looks at the risk aversion of the players, which is ignored in most DA papers like the 
Reny and Perry (2006)'s. I would extend Kyle's paper by looking at the buyer and seller 
sides separately. I would investigate the fully revealing properties of price with the 
presence of informed, uninformed speculators and noise traders. 
But there are limitations of my model: 
(i) I only consider symmetric strategies of the buyers/sellers. That means I assume 
all buyers of the same type will adopt the same strategy functions and all sellers use the 
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same strategy functions. The difference across the individual buyer/seller is just that they 
receive different information. 
(ii) My paper does not prove the existence of the equilibrium in double auctions. I 
simply assume equilibrium exists as other papers have already proved the existence. 
(iii) I consider only finite trades. Infinite units bid/offered are not allowed. 
(iv) Only linear strategies of the traders are concerned. I assume the trading 
strategy is a linear function of information received and the possible prices. The exact 
formulae will be explained in details in the next section. 
(v) For simplicity, I do not consider the k-DA setup; rather, the trading price 
would be a point. This is possible by allowing the quantities traded to be any real 
numbers rather than integers. If we allow k-DA, the computation would be more 
complicated but I believe the results obtained in this paper are similar. 
(vi) I assume the traders are large in number and individual influence on the 
market-clearing price is negligible. In other words, the price follows competitive REE 
and all traders take the price correspondence, a mapping from the information sets of all 
traders into the price space as given4 . 
4. The Model 
My model is an extension of Kyle (1989)'s work and mainly based on his model 
setup. So I would try to follow his notation. Firstly, I would consider the market with 
only informed buyers and informed sellers. Then in the extension section, uninformed 
speculators and noise traders will be introduced in the model. 
4 Refer to Brunnermeier, Markus K (2001): "Asset Pricing under Asymmetric Information 
-Bubbles, Crashes, Technical Analysis, and Herding," Oxford University Press, p. 14 
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There are N buyers and M sellers in the market. The buyers have symmetric 
strategy function and sellers have their own symmetric strategy function. The sellers 
possess one or more units of a homogenous asset. An individual can bid/offer for 
multiple units. Since I consider a large market with many buyers and sellers, with the aid 
of previous literatures, I assume equilibrium exists and the traders' best strategy is to be 
honest and bid according to their valuation of the asset. 
The players would first receive a unique private signal about the asset value, 
which is not known at the time of bidding. Then they would submit their strategy 
functions, indicating the quantities they would trade at each price interval. The auctioneer 
would then collect all the supply and demand curves to determine a price at which the 
market clears, i.e. the quantities demanded would be equal to the quantities supplied. 
Buyers who bid higher than the market-clearing price will win the assets and the sellers 
who bid lower than the price will successfully sell the asset. The readers should pay 
attention that the market clearing price is determined after all the bids and offers are 
submitted to the auctioneer. 
Assumption 4.1: The trading price p would be a discrete point due to the presence of 
many traders submitting continuous bids. 
The rationale behind is that, as mentioned in section 1, the price can be a range 
and the final price depends on the value of k, hence the name k-Double Auction. 
However, for simplicity reason, we simply assume that the market consists of a lot of 
buyers and sellers. The bids are continuous so the interval of the price range p E [p, d is 
so small that it resembles to a point. 
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The utility functions of the agents exhibits constant absolute risk aversion 
(CARA) and are denoted as below: 
For the nth buyer: Ub,n (n-b,n) = -e - p b7rb., , where n = 1, ... , N ( ]_) 
For the mth seller: U s (n- ) = -e -ps 1rs. m , where m = 1, ... , M 
,m s,m (2) 
(3) 
pb and Ps represent the risk aversion of buyers and sellers respectively. 
If pb and/or Ps equal 0, then the buyers and/or the sellers are risk neutral. p is the market 
clearing price, where all assets are traded at that price. v is the exogenous liquidation 
value of the asset. In this model, vis not known at the time of bidding. The traders only 
guess the value of v based on information they have received. But v should be a common 
element across all the traders. Xn is the number of units buyer n bought, which is 
nonnegative and Ym is the number of units seller m sold, which is non-positive. 
Both buyers and sellers are informed, i.e. they will receive a piece of unique 
private information. They only know their own information but not the others. The 
market has incomplete information and the traders have neither prior communication nor 
collusion among other traders. And the information received is defined as the following: 
For the nth buyer: 
(4) 




e b,n ---NID(O,l/re) 
es ,m --- NID(O,l/ r e) 
~,n is the private signal received by the nth buyer; 
~,m is the private signal received by the mth seller; 
ei ,J is the perturbation of the signal, which follows a normal distribution with 0 mean and 
1/ re variance; 
r e is the precision of the perturbation; 
r vis the precision of the true liquidation value of the asset. 
We shall restrict our attention to linear symmetric equations. 
Assumption 4.2: The demand schedule for buyers (xn 2: 0): 
(6) 
Assumption 4.3: The demand schedule for seller CYm :S 0): 
(7) 
Assumption ( 4.2) and ( 4.3) state that buyers and sellers are symmetric, i.e. they apply the 
same strategy schedules and have the same utility functions. Here we assume that the 
strategies schedules are linear functions of signals and possible trading prices. 
The main results of this paper are derived from the projection theorem for 
normally distributed variables. Details can be found in Kyle (1989). The theorem states 
that: 
Let u0, u1, • • • , uk be normally and independently distributed random variables with zero 
means and variances r~ 1 , r 1- 1, ••• , r~1 , 
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Now, we define some terms for us to measure the informational efficiency of the 
market by different players (modified from Kyle (1989), equations (13) to (15)): 
r F can be regarded as the precision of guessing the true value of the asset 
conditional on all the private information obtained in the market. By the projection 
theorem, it is equal to the summation of the precision of the true value and precisions of 
all the errors of the information. But individual private information is not observable by 
the third parties, so we try to introduce r b and r s . r b is the precision of guessing the true 
value of the asset conditional on the price and an individual ' s private signal, since it 
should be less than r F , we introduce rpb E [o, 1] in the equation. If rpb equals 1, then 
r b equals r F, that means for the buyer, by obtaining a private signal and observing the 
price, it is like collecting all the private signals in the market. In this case, the market is 
considered to be fully revealing. If rpb goes to the other extreme and equals 0, then the 
market is not revealing as the price seems to collect no information. This is the same case 
for r s . rpb and rps then measure the informational efficiency of the market, i.e. measure 
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how price aggregates information of informed traders. In the next section, we try to 
calculate under what conditions rpb =1 and rps =1 . 
5. Main Results 
The agents will submit their demand schedule as follows: 
(11) 
(12) 
where xn 5 is the demand schedule submitted by the nth buyer and y m is the supply 
schedule submitted by the mth seller. The schedules are determined to maximize the 
agent's utility function, i.e. when submitting the bid/offer, the agents try to maximize 
their utility, xn maximizes Ub,n and y m maximizes Us,m . At this stage, we have not found 
what the coefficients of the schedule functions are. We jut assume they are in the form as 
(11) and (12). We shall derive the what J1b, f3b, yb, Jls ,f3s andys are later. 
Consider when all the bids/offers are collected, now the auctioneer has to 
determine the market price, he would first consider clearing the market, i.e. 
(13) 
The quantities traded by all the buyers must be equal to the quantities traded by 
all the sellers. 
Substituting (11) and (12) into (13), we have 
N M L (ub + f3b~,n - rbp)+ L (JLs + f3s~,m - YsP)= 0 
5 The tilda (- )denotes random variable; its realization will be without the tilda. 
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(14) 
where we let/L == (Nr6 + Mrs )-1 (15) 
Equation (14) gives us the formula for the market clearing price. 
Let us introduce the terms "information equivalence", which is important to 
derive the results of this paper. If we have h6 , ~,n and p . h6 and ~,n are said to be 
informationally equivalence to p and ~,n if knowing the values of h6 and ~,n is the same 
as knowing the values of p and ~,n • In other words, h6 and ~,n contain the same 
information as p and~ n • Mathematically, it is written as: 
' 
E(v I h6 , ~ ,n )= E(v I p, ~ ,n )and var(v I h6 , ~ ,n )= var(v I p, ~ ,n ). 
This is obtained by letting: 
hb = ((N -1 )f3b + Mf3s )-1 (..1-1 p- (N Jib + MJLs)- f3b ~,n) 
=V +[(N -l},Bb + M,B,]-'(,Bb teb,i + ,8, t,e,,1 J (A.1) 
So, h6 can be transferred top by simply arranging the terms. There is some 
advantages of having h6 as it equals v plus some terms that are normally and 
independently distributed random variables with zero means and variances that can be 
found quite easily. Applying the projection theorem, 
1 1 
r, = var(h>vr [(N -l},Bb +M,B,r(.Bit :. + .B?t, :.] 
(A.2) 
[(N -1)/36 + Mf3s r re 
- (N -I)f3f + Mf3s2 
- 19-
1 1 
r - - - r 2 
- var(~ , n - v) - var(eb,n) - e (A.3) 
(A.4) 
By summing (A.2) and (A.3) with the precision of v, we have 
var-1(v I p~ T )= var-1(v I h T )= r +r + [(N - 1)f3b +Mf3sYre (16) 
' b,n b' b,n v e (N -1)J3~ + Mj3
5
2 
So similarly, we should get the following results for informed sellers: 
-I(~ I ~ "':"' ) [N f3b +(M -1 )f3s ]2 r e 
var v p z =r +r +--------
' s,m v e Nj3~ +(M _ 1)J3s2 (17) 
THEOREM 5 .1. The informational efficiencies of buyers and sellers depend only on the 
sensitivity to the information of both buyers and sellers and the number of informed 
buyers and sellers, i.e. rpb andrps is a function of M, N, f3b and f3s . 
Proof 
From (9), we have var-1 (vI p, ~ ,n )= rb = rv +re + (M+ N -1)re 
. [(N -1)f3b + Mf3 Y 
Companng the terms, finally, we have <P& = [( ) 2 2 k ' ) N -1 f3b + Mf3s M+ N -1 (18) 
And comparing (17) with (1 0), the informational efficiency for sellers is obtained: 
(19) 
It can be seen that rpb and rp s depends on M , N , f3b and f3s . Q.E.D 
Theorem 5.1 tells us that informational efficiency depends neither on the value of 
the asset nor the precision of the information. It depends only on the sensitivity of the 
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traders to the signals and the nmnber of informed traders participating in the market. 
Specifically, it can be inferred that if the nmnber of buyers and sellers grow sufficiently 
large, the effects of the sensitivity of the signals by the traders will become less 
significant, and lpb and 'Ps tends to 1. Thus, one condition for the price becoming fully 
revealing is that the number of traders in the market is sufficiently large. 
Let us derive also the informational efficiency of price only. 
(20) 
(/Jp measures the informational efficiency of price only. Since it is to compare with 
Tv, we set (20) as above so that if (/Jp = 1, then Tp = Tv. 
Using the informational equivalence property, let h be informationally equivalent top: 
h = (NfJb + Mflst 1(A-1p- (NJ-Lb + MJ-Ls)) 
=V+ [N,Bb + M,8J1(,8bteb,i + ,B,~es,j J 
By the projection theorem, r P = rv + var-1(h-v ), where 
1 1 
var(h -Vr [N,Bb +M,BJ2(..a:t :. + ..B?~ :J 
_ [NfJb + Mfls Y T e 
- NfJ~ + Mfls2 
Comparing (21) with (20): 
_ [NfJb +MflsY 





(i) If f3b = f3s , then rpb = rps = 1 and the price is fully-revealing to the individual informed 
traders. 
(ii) If rpb = rps = 1, then the price is fully-revealing to the whole market, i.e. rp P =I. 
Proof of part (i). 
From ( 18), to make rpb = 1 , we need to have: 
(23) 
Similarly, from (19), to make rps = 1, we need to have: 
(24) 
In a particular case, it can be shown that if f3b = f3s , then rpb = rps = 1. 
So, we have: f3b = f3s 
Proof of part (iz). 
( ) [Nf3b + Mf3s Y By 22 , we have <pP = ( 2 2 ) ( ) Nf3b +Mf3s IM+N 
This is the informational efficiency of price, which is observable in the market 
after all the bids/offers are submitted. If f3b = f3s, rp P = 1. Q.E.D 
Part (i) of theorem 5.2 states that if the buyers and sellers are not equally sensitive 
to their information received, then the price may be non-fully revealing unless equation 
(23) and/or (24) happens to be fulfilled. While most papers assume the traders have the 
same coefficient for signals, the finding here is important. One suggestion for the 
rationale behind theorem 5.2 is that if the buyers are more sensitive to the signals then the 
sellers (i.e. /3b> f3s), then the sellers may make use of this fact by overbidding (i.e. to bid 
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at a price higher than their reservation price) in their favor. So they tend to tell lies and 
this causes ex-post inefficiency. This is similar for the k-DA by having k tends to 0. But 
ifN and M are sufficiently large, the difference between /3b and f3s becomes trivial and (/Jb, 
(/Js tend to 1. The price becomes fully revealing. 
One plausible explanation of part (ii) of theorem 5.2 is that since the market 
contains only informed traders, since the price is fully-revealing to all the players in the 
market, it is fully-revealing to the market as a whole. 
Now we try to findE{v I p, ~,n }: 
E{v I p, ~,n }= E{v I hb, ~,n } 
= ':(J;b )+': (~ n ) 
r r ' 
(A.5) 
By substituting (A.l ), (A.2), (A.3) and (A.4) into (A.5), we have: 
Let us define two new terms <1> b and <1> s . They appear to make the equations look 
easier to read. They themselves have no economic meaning. They are defined as: 
<1> = M+N-l 
b (N -l)f3b + Mf3s 
(25) 
<1> = M+N-l 
s N{Jb +(M -l)f3s 
(26) 
Now, (A.6) becomes: 
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For the informed sellers, E {v I p, ~,n }is found similarly by using: 
hs = (N f3b +(M -1 )f3s )-1 (A-1 P- (N Jib + MJLs)- f3s ~,m ) 
=V +[N,B6 +(M -l),B,]-'(,86te6,; + ,B, ~e,,1 J 
So, we have: 
(27) 
(28) 
THEOREM 5.3. If a buyer is more sensitive to signal, one will demand more quantities if 
the signal received is higher in value; while if the seller is more sensitive to the private 
signal, they would try to have less supply, i.e. f3b is positively related to xn , f3s is 
positively related toy m. 
Proof In a large market with many buyers and sellers, suppose individual cannot 
influence price. For the buyer side, since the utility follows CARA function, maximizing 
the utility is equal to maximizing: 
max {E[v I jJ, ~,n ]- p }xn - i x; var[V I jJ, ~,n ] (for buyers) 
(for sellers) (29) 
(Derivation of equation (29) is in the Appendix.) 
By First Order Conditions, the optimal quantity traded for an individual buyer and seller 
for a particular price can be found as below: 
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(30) 
Substituting equations (27) and (28) into (30) and compare with (11) and (12), we can get 
the coefficient of the information to be: 
So, if f3b increases, xn increases and if f3s increases, y m increases. Q.E.D 
THEOREM 5 .4. The intercepts of the equations ( 6) and (7) equals 0, i.e. JLb = JLs = 0. 
Proof Now compare the intercept terms of(30) and (11), (12): 
(32) 
(33) 
For (32) and (33) to hold at the same time, we need: 
Q.E.D 
By the projection theorem again, we have: 
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(34) 
This is obtained in a similar way as how we obtain E{v I p, ~,n }andE{v I p, ~,m }. 
LEMMA 5.1. If Jlb = fl s = 0, then the expected true value of an asset equals the price 
only if 
Nf3b + Mf3s r e A-1 =I 
N/3~ + M/352 r P • 
By theorem 5.4, we have Jlb = fl s = 0, so: 
E{v I /5} = p when 
Nf3b + Mf3s r e A-1 = 1 
Na2 +M/32 r P b s p 
Q.E.D 
This equality is not easy to achieve, so normally, E {v I j5} :;t p .It can be inferred that the 
true value of the asset is generally not equal to the price of the asset. However, it can be 
seen that price is an unbiased estimator of the asset ' s value since for equation (34), all the 
parameters are known. So E {v I p} and p are one-to-one matching. 
6. Extensions 
6.1 Market with informed speculators and uninformed speculators 
In the first extension, two more types of traders are introduced to the market: 
uninformed buyers and uninformed sellers. They will not receive any private signal. Why 
are we interested in introducing other types of traders? Milgrom (1981) has mentioned 
that information is costly because if one does not have it, he will not enter into the market 
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where the others possess information or otherwise he will only lose. Others suggest that 
the uninformed traders can free-ride the informed ones if price is fully-revealing and 
information is costly. I would try to look into more details in this extension part. 
The notation will be similar as the previous section. First, we look at the 
demand/supply schedules of the traders: 
For informed buyers: 
n = 1, . .. ,N (35) 
For uninformed buyer: 
xu ,n' (p) = J.lu ,b - Yu ,bP ~ 0 n' = 1, · · ·, N' (36) 
For informed seller: 
(37) 
For uninformed seller: 
( ) - - < 0 '-1 M' Y · P - J.1 s Yu sP- m - , · · ·' u ,m u , , (38) 
Again, the informed buyers and sellers will each receive a private signal. 
For the buyers: 
(39) 
And for the sellers: 
(40) 
Where we have the following properties: 
e r-.J NID(o __!_J 
s m ' 
' re 
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The projection theorem tells us the following precis ions for the market if all 
information can be collected, for the informed buyers, informed sellers, uninformed 




ru,b = var- l (vI p) = rv + (/Ju,b (M+ N)re (44) 
(45) 
Since (44) and (45) are derived from var- 1(v I p) , so they should be numerically the same, 
i.e. rub =ru s =r ' and rpu b =rpu s =rpu. 
' ' ' ' 
At market clearing, all quantities traded should sum to 0: 
N M N' M' 
Lxi,n + LYi,m + Lxu,n' + L Yu ,m' = 0 (46) 
N M N ' M' 
L (ui,b + f3i ,bib,n- r i,bp )+ L (ui,s + f3i,s is,m- r i,sP )+ L (uu,b- Yu,bp)+ L Cuu,s - Yu ,sP )= 0 
p = x( NJ.l,,b + N'f.lu ,b + MJ.l,,, + M/1"·' + (NfJ,,b + MfJ, . .fii + fJ,,b i: (eb.J+ /],J~: (e,JJ 
(47) 








,....._, ) [(N -1){3. b + M/3. ]2 r 
var- V I p,...._, i = r + r + I , I ,S e 
' b,n v e (N -1)/32 + M/32 
l,b l ,S 
(50) 
(51) 
Comparing (50) with (42) we can obtain the informational efficiency of the informed 
traders: 
rpi ,b = ~(N - 1)/3.2 +M f3.? KM + N - 1) l ,b l ,S (52) 
Comparing (51) with (43): 
(/Ji,s = [NfJ? +(M -1)/3._2 KM+ N -1) 1,b l ,S 
[Nf3i,b +(M -1)~-,s P (53) 
It can be seen that the informational efficiencies do not depend on the number of 
uninformed traders. 
Now, we have: 
<I> = M+N-1 
i,b (N -1 )f3i,b + Mf3i,s (54) 
<I> = M+N-1 
i ,s N{J. +(M -1){3. 1,b l ,S 
(55) 




For the uninformed traders, we have: 
(58) 
{ } (Nf3.b +MfJ. )
2 
var vI p = r + I, l ,s r 
v N{J2 + M{J? e 
l ,b I ,S 
(59) 
_ (Nf3b +Mf3sY 
rpu - (N/3~ +Mf3s2 XM +N) (60) 
with 
<I>= M+N 
u Nf3b + Mf3s (61) 
We should notice that the results found here are very similar to the equations in section 5. 
Here, (/Ju does not depend on the number of lminformed traders but N and M, so the 
uninformed traders can be regarded as playing a passive role. 
THEOREM 6.1.1. 
(i) If f3i,b = f3i,s , then rpi,b = (/Ji,s = 1 and the price IS fully-revealing to the individual 
informed traders. 
(ii) If rpi,b = rpi,s = 1, then the price is fully-revealing to the whole market, i.e. rpu =1 . 
Proof We should also notice that the fully revealing properties will be similar to section 
5. The sensitivity to the signals should be the same for the informed buyers and informed 
traders to have fully revealing price, i.e.: if /3,. b = fJ.. , then rp . b = rp. = rp = 1. 
I, I , S I , I ,S U 
Q.E.D 
Since there are uninformed speculators in the market, the informed speculators 
will contemplate on their influence on price. 
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Assumption 6.1.1: The informed traders would affect the price by bidding/offering more 
units. And the influence would be as follows: 
P == Pb + A .bx. 
,n 1, 1,n (62) 
P == p""' +A,. Y · s,m 1,s 1,m (63) 
Pb ,n , Ai,b , P s,m and A-i ,s are constants. The equations show that an increase in xi ,n and 
y . would increase p . 1,m 
The above modification will alter the optimal quantity traded by the informed buyers and 
sellers (Details in the Appendix): 
(64) 
(65) 
For the uninformed traders, 
iib ,n' == (E(v I p)- p)xu ,n' 
Since the utility function follows CARA, maxnmzing the profit IS like 
maximiZing: 
(E(""' I""') ""')""' Pub "--'2 (""'I""') V p - p Xu ,n' -zxu,n' Var V p (66) 
Assumption 6.1.2: The uninformed buyer would also consider their influence on price, 
we let 
P == p""'b , +A bx , ,n u, u,n (67) 
E(""' I,......,) ,......, 
F.O.C.: x* n' == V p - Pb,n' 
u , 2/tu ,b + Pu ,b I ru 
,......,* _ E(v I p)- p 
Or x , --..:....__:_~~-
u,n 1 I 
Au ,b + Pu ,b ru 
(68) 
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Similarly for the uninformed sellers, we have ji' , = E(V I P)- P 
u,m 1 / 
Au,s + Pu ,s ru 
(69) 
PROPOSITION 6.1.1. The uninformed buyers will not enter into the market if there are 
only informed and uninformed speculators into the market. 
Proof Compare (68) with (36) and (69) with (38), we have: 
f.lu ,s = -rpu ,s <l> u,s ~ (N J.li,b + N'J.lu ,b + MJ.li ,s + M'J.lu ,s ) 
Pu ,s 
They can be re-written as: 
( 1 + N' rpu,b <l> u,b ~Jf.lu ,b = -rpu,b <l> u,b ~ (N J.li,b + MJ.li ,s + M'J.lu ,s ) 
Pu ,b P u,b 
( 1+M' <l> ~J =- <l> ~(N N' M ) rpu,s u,s f.lu ,s rpu ,s u,s J.li ,b + f.lu,b + J.li,s P u,s P u,s 
For the equations (35) to (38) to have economic meaning, we assume the intercepts are 
nonnegative, but rpu,b , <l> u,b , rpu,s and <l> u,s should also be nonnegative. So we need to have 
f.lu ,b = f.lu,s =0. But if we refer to (36), it will become: x u,n' (p) = -ru,&P 2 0 , this only holds 
if p = 0 or Yu ,b =0 (if Y u,b :::; 0 , that equation will be against the economic sense.) So the 
conclusion is xu ,n' {p):::; 0 and the buyers will not enter into the market. But for the sellers, 
by definition, Y u,m' {p):::; 0 . So the uninformed sellers would still participate into the 
market. Q.E.D 
Theorem 6.1.2 shows that the uninformed buyers would be discouraged into 
participating into the market as they know that the informed speculators would try to 
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benefit at their expenses. So if a person possesses no asset and no private information, he 
will not enter into the market or he will only lose. This is in line with Milgrom (1981)'s 
findings. This also explains why information is still costly even the price is fully 
revealing. But for the uninformed sellers, they would still enter into the market as they do 
not mind as long as the assets can generate positive return to them. This finding is a 
novice among the literatures as few papers look into the unformed buyers and sellers 
separately. The result is interesting as we can interpret that a player would determine 
whether to enter into the market or not based on (i)if he has unique private information 
and also (ii) if he possesses the asset or not. 
6.2 Markets with informed speculators, uninformed speculators and noise traders 
Now we introduce the noise traders. If the noise traders are presented into the 
model, it will be very much like Kyle (1989)'s model only that we are now considering 
both the buyer and seller sides. We assume the noise traders trade in an aggregate sum 
independent of price, and they will take the assets no matter the price level. So we need 
not consider the optimal quantity traded by them. The difference with the previous model 
is at the market clearing, we have 
N M N' M' 
""' x. + ""' Y· + ""' X , +""' y , + z = 0 ~ z,n ~ z,m ~ u,n ~ u ,m (70) 
z is the aggregate sum traded by the noise traders, where it is normally distributed 
with 0 mean and O" ~ variance. This assumption is reasonable in the sense that there may 
be some traders who are rich enough that they do not care about the price but just want to 
purchase the asset. Or there may be some people (i.e. noise sellers) who want to take the 
cash rather than holding the asset. 
The market-clearing price will be adjusted as: 
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(71) 
THEOREM 6.2.1 With the presence of noise traders, the price is no longer fully 
revealing even the sensitivities to signals are the same for both informed buyers and 
sellers. 




,......_ ) [N ~- b + (M - 1)~- )2 r 
var- V I p""'-' i == r + r + l , l,S e 
' s ,m V e N" n2 + (M - 1) n 2 2 
P i,b P i ,s + CY z r e 
(73) 
From (72) and (73), we can have the informational efficiencies: 
(74) 
(75) 
They are different from before with an additional termCY~ re . If CY~ grows larger, 
rpi,b andrpi,s are further away from 1, even f3i ,b = f3i ,s . Q.E.D 
This finding is very similar to Kyle ( 1989) ' s result. The fully revealing property 
of price depends on the behavior of the noise traders. Since CY: measures the variance of 
quantity traded by the noise traders, if the noise traders behave in unanimity, 
CY: decreases and the price reveals more information about the market information. If the 
noise traders perform very randomly, then CY: may increase and the price reveals less 
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information. So the predictability of noise trading behavior determines the informational 
efficiencies of the market. 
Again, we let: 
<I> = M+N-1 
i,b (N -1 )f3i,b + Mf3i,s (76) 
<D . = M +N -1 
z,s NfJi,b +(M -l)fJi,s (77) 
We have the conditional expectations for informed speculators: 
E{v I p, ~ n }=(/Jib <I>i b ~(A-'- ) p- Jl )+ (1- (/Jib <I> i bf3i b )~~ n 
' ' ' T ' ' ' T ' i,b i,b 
(78) 
(79) 
(56) and (57) are the same as (78) and (79), only that the content of q;i,b and (/Ji,s are 




u Nf3b +Mf3s (81) 
And 
(82) 
THEOREM 6.2.2. The uninformed buyers will not enter into the market if there are only 
informed and uninformed speculators and noise traders into the market. 
Proof 
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With the aid of (80) and (81 ), (82) can be re-written as 
E {vI p} = qJu <l> u ~ (,tf--1 p- JL), if we compare with (38), we will finally find that the 
r u,b 
intercepts of the equations will be zero. As in theorem 6.1.2, the uninformed buyers 
would still be not interested in entering into the market while the uninformed sellers 
would still join the market. Q.E.D 
7. Conclusion 
For most double auction literatures, they focus on single unit buying and selling. 
My model is a modification of Kyle(1989)'s model and allows multiple units of trading. 
Few look at the buyers and sellers separately. My finding shows that the buyers and 
sellers may behave differently in some situations. I have step by step introduced 
informed, uninformed speculators and noise traders into the model and have shown that 
markets with different players participating can lead to different results. If there are only 
informed and uninformed speculators, the price is fully revealing if the informed buyers 
and sellers are equally sensitive to the signals they receive. Uninformed buyers would not 
enter into the market or they will only lose. One the other hand, if there are also noise 
traders, uninformed buyers would still not enter the market. The price is no longer fully 
revealing. The more random is the noise trading behavior, the less information price 
conveys 
Future work can be to consider infinite trades, having the model under the k-DA 
setting and multi-dimensional signals received. It is also possible to relax the assumption 
of large market to investigate the price manipulation of traders 
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APPENDIX 
For the derivation of equation (29): 
First consider a generalized case where the utility function U follows CARA and is 
denoted as: U = -ke-piw, k is a arbitrary constant (where we take 1 in our model), pi is 
the risk aversion of agent i and W is the wealth of that agent. Taking expectation, 
(w - E(w ))2 
E[Ui(W)]= f CX) Ui(W)J(W)dW = [ CX)-ke-piw ·e 2 var(w) dW 
The exponent can be written as: 
_ p.W _ [w- E(wW = _ 2 var{W)p,W + W2 + [E(W)Y - 2W. E(w) 
l 2var(w) 2var(w) 
_ [w- [E(w)- pi var(w)ll2 + 2piE(W)var(w)- pi2 var(wY 
- 2var(w) 
The last part depends on the constants E(W)and var(w), but not on the random variable 
w' so 
E(u,(w))= -exp(- p,E(W)+ p,2 var{W)12)· [ kexp(-(w-(E(W)- p, var(w)))2 /2 var(w)~w 
The integral is 1, because it is the integral of the density function for a normal variable 
with meanE(W)- pi var(w) and variance var(w), so finally: 
That means maximizing E[Ui(w)]is the same as maximizing E(W)- pi var(W)/2. 
In our model, for a buyer, E(W) = {E(v I p, ~.n )- p }xn, so the variance will be 
var(W) = x~ {var(v I p, ~.n )+ var(p)- cov(E(v I p, ~.n } p )} = x~ var(v I p, ~.n ) 
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So maximizing the utility will be the same as maximizing: 
For the sellers, just change the quantity to be traded from xn to y m , the 
information received from ~,n to ~,m and the risk aversion from pb toPs , and then we have 
the result of (29). Q.E.D. 
For equation (30): 
Differentiate the equation with respect to xn and set it to 0, i.e.: 
{E[v I p, ~,n ]- p }- pbxn var[v I p, ~,n] = 0 
So the first order condition for optimal xn equals: 
Q.E.D. 
For the rest part of Theorem 5.3 and for Theorem 5.4: 
Substitute (27) into (30) gives us: 
(/Jb <l> b ~(A-I P- (N Jlb + MJLs) )+ (1- rpb <l> bfJb )~ ~,n - P 
* rb rb 
xn =----~--------------------------~----
Pb I rb 
( rpb <l> b ~ A-1 -lJp- rpb <l> b ~ (N Jlb + MJLs) + (1- rpb <l> bf3b )~ ~,n 
- rb rb rb 
Pb I rb 
re ( ) ( re -I J rb ( n ) re --:--
= -rpb<l>b-- Npb + MJLs + rpb<l>b -A -1 --p + 1- rpb<l>bfJb --zb,n 
pb rb pb pb 
Comparing with (11), which is xn(p, ib,n)= Jlb + f3b~,n- rb P ' equalizing the coefficient 
of~,n of the two equations would be: 
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(1- rpb C!> b fJb )~ == fJb (this is used in the theorem 5.3); 
pb 
Equalizing the coefficient of the intercept: 
J.-Lb == -rpbe!>b re (NJ.-Lb +MJ.-Ls) (this is used in the theorem 5.4) 
pb 
To obtain (64), first, let us revisit (30): 
( 62) tells us that p == Pb ,n + Ai,bxi,n, so substitute it into (30), we have: 
{£[,....... I ,....... '":-' ] ,....... 'J } Pb 2 [,....... I ,....... '":-' ] max V Pb n' lb n - Pb n -/'vi bxi n xi n --xi n var V Pb n' lb n 
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